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INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 2012, 312,949,403 people lived in the United
States.1 Nearly eleven and a half million of those people were
undocumented immigrants.2 Whether the right to bear arms conferred
to “the people” by the Second Amendment reaches those 11.4 million
people depends on whether undocumented immigrants make up part of
“the people.”
Placing human beings into figurative, linguistic boxes can be a
fickle adventure. The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines a human
being as “a person.”3 At first blush, that contention does not present
 J.D. candidate, December 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology; B.A., English Literature, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign, 2010.
1
U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last updated Nov. 26, 2015).
2
Brian Baker & Nancy Rytina, ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2012, at 1
(2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf.
3
Person, MERRIAM–WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/person.
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much controversy. However, in the eyes of the law, human beings may
not qualify as “persons.” And collectively, a group of persons may not
make up “the people.”
The United States Constitution makes extensive use of the term
“the people.” Elsewhere, the Constitution, presumably deliberately,
uses other terms, such as “persons” or “citizens” or “Citizens.”
Though the phrase “the people” appears throughout the Constitution,
and though courts contrast the phrase with “persons” or “citizens,”
who or what constitutes “the people” keeps legal scholars, courts, and
students busy.
In the 2015 case United States v. Meza-Rodriguez,4 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
undocumented immigrants in the United States who have developed
sufficient connections with the country are part of “the people” to
whom the Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms. In so
doing, the Seventh Circuit employed the sufficient connections test for
defining “the people.” This decision is consistent with the U.S.
Constitution and previous Second Amendment jurisprudence.
Part I of this article details relevant Supreme Court cases,
including District of Columbia v. Heller, the landmark Second
Amendment case, and United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which
addressed “the people” protected by the Fourth Amendment. Part II
examines United States v. Meza-Rodriguez factually and procedurally.
It also discusses the Seventh Circuit’s majority opinion and Judge
Flaum’s concurrence. Finally, Part III analyzes the circuit split on this
Second Amendment issue as it pertains to undocumented immigrants,
and explains why the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Meza-Rodriguez is
superior to the approaches adopted by the Courts of Appeals for the
Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits.

4

United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664 (7th Cir. 2015).
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BACKGROUND
A. The Second Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)
The Second Amendment provides that “the right of the people to
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed.”5 In District of Columbia
v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment confers
an individual right to keep and bear arms.6 While the right to bear
arms has been dubbed an “ancient right,”7 that right is not unlimited.8
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) statutorily mandates restrictions on the possession
of firearms for various groups of people, including: convicted felons;
fugitives from justice; unlawful users of controlled substances; and the
mentally ill, among others.9 The statute also restricts “any person . . .
who, being an alien . . . is illegally or unlawfully in the United States”
from possessing a firearm,10 the group of people addressed in United
States v. Meza-Rodriguez and three other federal appellate court
opinions. The Second Amendment confers a right to “the people,” but
the Supreme Court has not addressed whether the undocumented
immigrants restricted from firearm possession by 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(5) are included in “the people.”
B. District of Columbia v. Heller11
In Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment
confers an individual right to bear arms.12 In Heller, a Washington,
D.C., statute effectively served as a total ban on handgun possession.13
5

U.S. CONST. amend. II.
Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008).
7
Id. at 599.
8
Id. at 595.
9
18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012).
10
Id. § 922(g)(5).
11
554 U.S. 570.
12
Id. at 595.
13
Id. at 635.
6
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A D.C. police officer brought suit seeking an injunction to prohibit
Washington, D.C., from enforcing the ban.14 Justice Scalia delivered
the opinion of the five to four majority.15 The Court did not seek to
determine the “full scope” of the Second Amendment,16 and, therefore,
Heller left open the question of Second Amendment rights of
undocumented immigrants within the United States.
In a distinctly textual analysis, Justice Scalia first looked to the
operative clause of the Second Amendment and focused on “the right
of the people.”17 He highlighted the prevalence of “the people”
throughout the Constitution and concluded that the First, Fourth, and
Ninth Amendments refer to individual rights, not collective rights.18
Moreover, “the people” refers to “all members of the political
community,”19 but Justice Scalia also stated in dicta that the right
“belongs to all Americans,”20 though he did not say the right belongs
only to Americans. Moreover, Justice Scalia relied on United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez to reinforce the sufficient connections test: the
Supreme Court views “the people” as referring to a “class of persons
who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community.”21
It is also worth noting that Justice Scalia considered restrictions
on the Second Amendment right to bear arms as permissible, stating
that not all restrictions infringe on Second Amendment rights.22
However, the D.C. restriction was deemed “severe” and
unconstitutional.23
14

Id. at 575.
Id. at 595.
16
Id. at 627.
17
Id. at 579.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 580.
20
Id. at 581.
21
Id. at 580.
22
Id. at 629.
23
Id.
15
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C. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez24
The Second Amendment is not the only amendment in the Bill of
Rights that confers rights to “the people”; the First and Fourth
Amendments also confer rights to “the people.” While the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether undocumented immigrants are within
“the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a right to bear
arms, the Court has considered the constitutional rights granted to
undocumented immigrants by other amendments. In United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
the Fourth Amendment protected undocumented immigrants outside
the territory of the United States.25 In Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and
resident of Mexico involved in narcotics cartels was arrested in
Mexico for cartel activities connected to the United States, and he was
transported to the United States before his trial.26 While he was in
United States custody, U.S. law enforcement officers searched his
home in Mexico without a search warrant.27 The officers found
evidence linking the defendant to the drug trade.28 The defendant
brought a motion to suppress the evidence recovered at the house in
Mexico, arguing that the warrantless search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights.29 The district court agreed and suppressed the
fruits of the warrantless search, and the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.30 In reaching this decision, the Ninth
Circuit relied on INS v. Lopez-Mendoza,31 where the Supreme Court

24

494 U.S. 259 (1990).
Id. at 266.
26
Id. at 262.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 262–63.
29
Id. at 263.
30
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988).
31
468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
25
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assumed that the Fourth Amendment protected undocumented
immigrants in the United States.32
The Supreme Court reversed.33 The Court initially looked to the
Fifth Amendment,34 which provides insight into the Fourth
Amendment35: both amendments carry a “scale of rights” that ascends
with ties to the United States.36 However, the Court found that the
Fifth Amendment operated differently than the Fourth Amendment.37
While Fifth Amendment violations occur during trial, a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs at the time of the search.38
The Court then turned to the meaning of “the people.”39 The Court
highlighted the idea that the phrase “the people” is found in the First,
Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendments, as well as the
Preamble and Article I.40 The Court concluded that the proliferation of
the phrase “suggests that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom
rights and powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments,
refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or
who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this county
to be considered part of that community.”41 This is known as the
sufficient connections test,42 or the substantial connections test. The
Court has only assumed, but never held, that Fourth Amendment rights
attach to undocumented immigrants within the United States, and the
32

Id. at 1050.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275.
34
“No person shall be held to answer for a . . . crime, unless on a presentment
or indictment of a grand jury.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
35
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
36
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265, 269.
37
Id. at 265.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 266.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 282 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
33

97

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/5

6

Etchingham: Who Are "The People?": The Seventh Circuit Extends Second Amendme

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

Court did not decide that question in Verdugo-Urquidez.43 Applying
the sufficient connections test to this case, the Court found that
Verdugo-Urquidez would have failed the test because he “had no
voluntary connection” with the United States that “might place him
among ‘the people’ of the United States.”44 Thus, the Court in
Verdugo-Urquidez, at the very least, set forth the sufficient connections
test for deciding who constitutes “the people” under the Fourth
Amendment. In the process, it highlighted the prevalence of the phrase
throughout the United States’ most sacred legal document.
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence promoted a broader reading of the
Fourth Amendment right.45 While he did not put weight into the phrase
“the people,” Justice Kennedy highlighted that the phrase “may be
interpreted to underscore the importance of the right, rather than to
restrict” the potential group protected by the right.46 In the dissent,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, focused on two concepts:
mutuality and fundamental fairness.47 He admonished the majority’s
“narrow construction” of “the people,” and would have held that the
defendant was part of “the people” protected by the Fourth
Amendment because he was part of “the governed.”48
UNITED STATES V. MEZA-RODRIGUEZ
A. Factual Background
On August 24, 2013, Milwaukee police officers responded to a
call concerning an armed person at a Milwaukee bar.49 Bar
surveillance captured video of a man pointing an object resembling a
gun, and witnesses from the bar identified Mariano A. Meza43

Id. at 271–72 (majority opinion).
Id. at 273.
45
Id. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
46
Id. at 277.
47
Id. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48
Id. at 287.
49
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 666 (7th Cir. 2015).
44
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Rodriguez as the person in the video.50 Later that night, officers
responding to a different report broke up a fight and recognized Mr.
Meza-Rodriguez as the man from the bar video.51 Mr. MezaRodriguez was arrested by the Milwaukee police officers with a .22
caliber cartridge on his person.52 On October 9, 2013, a federal grand
jury indicted Mr. Meza-Rodriguez on a single count of being an illegal
alien in possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).53
B. Procedural Background
Mr. Meza-Rodriguez brought three motions before the court: (1) a
motion to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege an element of the
offense; (2) a motion to dismiss the indictment for violating Mr. MezaRodriguez’s Second Amendment right to bear arms; and (3) a motion
to suppress evidence.54 Judge Randa of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin sent the case to Magistrate
Judge Callahan to hear the motions.55 Judge Callahan recommended
that the district court deny all three motions.56 Judge Randa adopted
Magistrate Judge Callahan’s recommendations on the motions in toto,
as well as the rationale upon which the recommendations rested.57

50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, No. 13-CR-192, 2014 WL 1406301, at *1
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 11, 2014).
54
Id. at *2.
55
Id. at *1.
56
Id.
57
Id.
51
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1. District Court Adopts Magistrate Judge Callahan’s
Recommendations
Magistrate Judge Callahan analyzed Meza-Rodriguez’s motion to
dismiss by addressing his facial challenge of § 922(g)(5).58 Judge
Callahan started his analysis with a look to Heller to find that “the
people” refers to all members of the political community and “belongs
to all Americans.”59 He then distinguished this case from Heller by
stating that Heller did not provide a comprehensive scope of the
Second Amendment right and the Supreme Court had not addressed
the issue as it pertains to undocumented immigrants.60 For guidance,
the court instead turned to the federal circuit court cases that have held
that “the people” does not include undocumented immigrants within
the United States.61 The court found these decisions persuasive. The
court further rejected the Verdugo-Uriquidez sufficient connections
test by relying on the Fifth Circuit’s rejection of the test in United
States v. Portillo-Munoz.62 Accordingly, the court found that Second
Amendment rights did not extend to Mr. Meza-Rodriguez.63
After the denial of Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s motions, he pled guilty
to violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) while preserving the Second
Amendment issue for appeal.64 As the result of an interview with an
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officer, removal proceedings
were initiated against Mr. Meza-Rodriguez, and he was eventually
deported to Mexico.65 He filed a timely notice of appeal in the Seventh
Circuit.66

58

Id. at *4–6.
Id. at *1.
60
Id. at *4.
61
Id. at *5.
62
Id.; United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011).
63
Meza-Rodriguez, No. 13-CR-192, 2014 WL 1406301, at *6.
64
United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 667 (7th Cir. 2015).
65
Id.
66
Id.
59
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C. The Seventh Circuit’s Panel Opinion
1. Opinion of the Court
Chief Judge Wood, joined by Judge Easterbrook and in the
judgment with Judge Flaum, held that the Second Amendment confers
to undocumented immigrants within the United States a right to bear
arms.67 As a preliminary procedural matter, Chief Judge Wood held
that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez appeal was not moot.68 To not be rendered
moot, an appeal must represent a case or controversy where the
appellant ‘“must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury
traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable
judicial decision.’”69 Chief Judge Wood found this requirement
satisfied because an unfavorable decision would bar his admission to
the United States and a favorable decision would leave open the
possibility of admission.70 The potential return to the United States
constituted a tangible benefit and his inability to reenter constituted a
concrete or continuing injury.71 Therefore, the appeal was not moot.72
In reviewing the merits of the case de novo, Chief Judge Wood
looked to Heller.73 She confronted “passing references” in Heller that
indicated a link between a Second Amendment right and “notions of
‘law-abiding citizens’ and ‘members of the political community.’”74
However, she was “reluctant to place more weight on these passing
references than the [Heller] Court itself did.”75 Chief Judge Wood
acknowledged that the three circuits to decide this issue held that,
under Heller, the Second Amendment did not confer a right to
67

Id. at 672.
Id. at 667.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 668.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 669.
74
Id. (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008)).
75
Id.
68
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unlawful aliens to bear arms, and the Tenth Circuit declined to decide
the issue because § 922(g)(5) passed intermediate scrutiny.
However, the court declined to follow the other circuits because
“[t]he issue was not . . . before the Court in Heller.”76 Instead, Chief
Judge Wood looked to other language in Heller to arrive at a
conclusion opposite the three other circuits.77 As Heller pointed out,
the Second Amendment is intimately linked to the First and Fourth
Amendments,78 and, therefore, those three amendments implicitly
carry the same meaning for the phrase “the people,” which appears in
all three.79 Accordingly, the Second Amendment could be analyzed as
a “package” with the other amendments and thus be interpreted
similarly.80
Chief Judge Wood then looked to United States v. VerdugoUrquidez,81 the Fourth Amendment Supreme Court case involving an
unauthorized alien.82 Recall that Verdugo-Rodriguez set forth a test for
determining whether noncitizens receive Fourth Amendment
protections. This test—the sufficient connections test—considers
whether the undocumented immigrant is within the territory of the
United States and whether she can show sufficient connections with
the United States.83 Chief Judge Wood applied this test in MezaRodriguez.84 Chief Judge Wood determined that Mr. Meza-Rodriguez
did have sufficient connections with the United States: he had been in
the United States for over twenty years since the age of four or five, he
76

Id.
Id. (“[A]ll people, including non-U.S. citizens, whether or not they are
authorized to be in the country, enjoy at least some rights under the Second
Amendment.”).
78
Heller, 554 U.S. at 592.
79
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 669.
80
Id. at 670.
81
494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections when
they have come within the territory of the United States and developed sufficient
connections” with the United States).
82
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670.
83
Id.; accord Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271.
84
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 670–71.
77
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attended public school in the United States, worked in the United
States, and developed close relationships with people in the United
States.85 She buttressed her reasoning with Plyler v. Doe,86 which held
that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come
within the territory of the United States and developed substantial
connections with this country.”87 Therefore, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was
entitled to constitutional protections because he was within the
territory of the United States and had developed sufficient connections
with the United States.88 Accordingly, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez was part
of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment right to bear arms
applies.89
However, in reaching this decision, the Seventh Circuit did
recognize that Second Amendment rights are not unlimited; they are
subject to certain restrictions, particularly under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).90
The Seventh Circuit therefore adopted an intermediate scrutiny
standard of review to determine the constitutionality of § 922(g)(5).91
Thus, §922(g)(5) is constitutional if its restrictions are substantially
related to an important governmental objective.92 Chief Judge Wood
found that the governmental objective of § 922(g)(5) is to ‘“keep guns
out of the hands of presumptively risky people’ and to ‘suppress[ ]
armed violence.’”93 Chief Judge Wood reasoned that undocumented
immigrants in the United States fit that group of presumptively risky
people.94 Accordingly, Chief Judge Wood held that Congress’ interest
in restricting firearm possession of this difficult to track group is
85

Id.
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
87
Id. at 210.
88
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 672.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 673 (quoting United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 683 (7th Cir.
2010)).
94
Id.
86

103

https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol11/iss1/5

12

Etchingham: Who Are "The People?": The Seventh Circuit Extends Second Amendme

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 11, Issue 1

Fall 2015

“strong enough” to find that § 922(g)(5) does not impermissibly
infringe Mr. Meza-Rodriguez’s Second Amendment rights.95
2. Judge Flaum’s Concurring Opinion
Judge Flaum’s concurrence did not reach the Second Amendment
conclusion.96 Instead, he found § 922(g)(5) passes intermediate
scrutiny,97 He would have followed the Tenth Circuit’s98 “prudential
approach” of reserving resolution of whether the Second Amendment
grants undocumented immigrants the right to bear arms to another case
“that compels addressing it.”99 While noting that the Second
Amendment might extend to undocumented immigrants under
Verdugo-Urquidez, Judge Flaum also expressed doubt as to whether
the Second Amendment extends past citizens based on language in
Heller referring to “members of the national community” and “law
abiding, responsible citizens.”100
3. Post-Decision Procedure
Because the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Meza-Rodriguez created
a circuit split, all active Seventh Circuit judges received the opinion.
However, no judge voted to hear the case en banc. On November 16,
2015, Mr. Meza-Rodriguez filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
which remains pending as of the publication of this article.101

95

Id.
Id. at 674 (Flaum, J., concurring).
97
Id.
98
United States v. Huitron-Guizar, 678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2010).
99
Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d at 674 (Flaum, J., concurring).
100
Id.
101
Id., petition for cert. filed (Nov. 16, 2015) (No. 15-7017).
96
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THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. United States v. Portillo-Munoz102
Almost four years before the Seventh Circuit decided MezaRodriguez, the Fifth Circuit became the first circuit to examine
whether the Second Amendment right to bear arms extends to
unlawful aliens.103 In United States v. Portillo-Munoz, a Mexican
national residing in Texas was arrested for unlawfully carrying a
weapon and possession of a controlled substance.104 The defendant
had been in the United States for eighteen months and worked as a
ranch hand.105 He also financially supported his girlfriend and her
daughter106 and paid rent.107 Upon arrest, the defendant claimed that he
possessed the gun to protect the ranch’s chickens from coyotes.108 The
district court denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss, and he pled
guilty to being an alien unlawfully in the United States under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).109 The defendant filed a timely notice of
appeal.110
The Fifth Circuit started its “categorical approach,”111 in the sense
that it precludes all undocumented immigrants from constituting part
of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a right to
bear arms, by establishing that language in Heller “provides some
guidance” as to whether unlawful aliens are within the scope of “the
people” protected by the Second Amendment.112 The Fifth Circuit
102

643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011).
See generally id.
104
Id. at 438–39.
105
Id. at 439.
106
Id. at 437.
107
Id. at 443.
108
Id. at 438.
109
Id. at 439.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 440.
103

105
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borrowed language from Heller, which Chief Judge Wood determined
in Meza-Rodriguez was not conclusive,113 to presume that not only are
unlawful immigrants not “law-abiding, responsible citizens” or
“members of the political community,” unlawful immigrants are “not
Americans as that word is commonly understood.”114
The Fifth Circuit also declined to apply the sufficient connections
test from Verdugo-Urquidez.115 That court reasoned that the Supreme
Court never actually held that Fourth Amendment protections extend
to “a native and citizen of another nation who entered and remained in
the United States illegally.”116
The court then addressed Verdugo-Urquidez.117 Unlike the
Seventh Circuit in Meza-Rodriguez, the Fifth Circuit found that the
Second and Fourth Amendments should be read differently.118 First,
the Fifth Circuit highlighted the idea that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court
did not expressly hold that the Fourth Amendment extends to natives
and citizens of other nations who are in the United States illegally.119
The Fifth Circuit went on to say that even if undocumented
immigrants hold Fourth Amendment protections that does not mean
that Second Amendment protections attach as well.120 The court
focused on the different purposes of the two amendments; the Second
Amendment confers an “affirmative right” whereas the Fourth
Amendment confers a “protective right.”121 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that since affirmative rights do not extend so far as protective rights,
the Second Amendment protects more limited groups than does the
Fourth Amendment, and thus an extension of Verdugo-Urquidez to the

113

United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2015).
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 441.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 440–41.
114

106
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Second Amendment realm was misguided.122 After distinguishing
Verdugo-Rodriguez, the court highlighted the deference given to
Congress in immigration matters, specifically highlighting the idea
that undocumented immigrants could turn into political assassins if the
prohibition on their gun rights did not exist.123
1. Judge Dennis’ Dissent
Judge Dennis penned a dissent that reads very closely to Chief
Judge Wood’s Seventh Circuit opinion in Meza-Rodriguez.124 Judge
Dennis found that the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient connections test
applied because Heller established that “the people” protected by the
Second Amendment are the same as those also protected by the First
and Fourth Amendments.125 Applying the test, he found that the
defendant “plainly satisfie[d] both criteria” because he was voluntarily
present in the United States for eighteen months, paid rent, and
financially supported his girlfriend and daughter.126
He also cautioned against the majority’s reading of “the people,”
highlighting the “far-reaching consequences” of its reading.127
According to Judge Dennis, a reading that excluded undocumented
immigrants from the protections of the Second Amendment could also
exclude those immigrants, containing potentially millions of people,
from First and Fourth Amendment protections.128 Finally, Judge
Dennis also found the majority’s distinction between an affirmative
right and a protective right “unpersuasive” since Heller described the
Second Amendment right as a codification of a pre-existing right.129

122

Id.
Id.
124
See id. at 442 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
125
Id.
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Id. at 447.
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Id. at 443.
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Id. at 444.
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B. United States v. Flores130
Like Portillo-Munoz, where the district court adopted the
recommendation of a magistrate judge, the District of Minnesota
adopted the recommendations of a magistrate judge, and concluded
that unlawful aliens do not possess a Second Amendment right in
United States v. Flores.131 The Eighth Circuit’s per curiam opinion
affirmed the district court without elaboration, agreeing with the Fifth
Circuit’s categorical approach in Portillo-Munoz.132
In Flores, Magistrate Judge Janie S. Mayeron issued a report and
recommendation on a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) case where an
undocumented immigrant was charged after being found in possession
of a handgun.133 Magistrate Judge Mayeron recommended the denial
of the defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment.134
Judge Mayeron relied on Heller in making this determination.135
She first found that undocumented immigrants are not part of the
“national community” or “political community,” and undocumented
immigrants are “inherently not ‘law-abiding’” because their
“unsanctioned entry in the United States” is a crime.136 She then cited
to several United States district court cases from 2008 to 2010 that
found that the Second Amendment did not extend to undocumented
immigrants.137 She then distinguished INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, which
stated that undocumented immigrants held Fourth Amendment
protections, by focusing on the idea that the United States did not

130

663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
Id. at 1023.
132
Id.
133
United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM), 2010 WL 4721069, at *1
(D. Minn. Sept. 17, 2010).
134
Id. at *4.
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Id. at *2.
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Id.
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make a finding as to whether undocumented immigrants were afforded
Fourth Amendment protections in this case.138
She also distinguished Verdugo-Urquidez.139 First, Magistrate
Judge Mayeron acknowledged that in Verdugo-Urquidez, the Court
noted that it had yet to determine whether undocumented immigrants
retained Fourth Amendment protections.140 However, she did
acknowledge that the Verdugo-Urquidez Court insisted that Fourth
Amendment protection would depend on whether the undocumented
immigrant had accepted societal obligations.141 Accordingly,
Magistrate Judge Mayeron could “envision” an undocumented
immigrant who is involved in the community and law-abiding.142
However, the facts of Flores did not present that opportunity.143 The
District Court of Minnesota accepted Magistrate Judge Mayeron’s
report and recommendation and denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss.144 The Eighth Circuit emphatically affirmed in a per curiam
decision.145 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.146
C. United States v. Carpio-Leon147
The Fourth Circuit also considered this issue in United States v.
Carpio-Leon.148 In Carpio-Leon, a Mexican national was arrested for
violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) after a consensual search of his home

138

Id. at *4.
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
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Id.
143
Id. at *4.
144
United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM), 2010 WL 4720223, *2 (D.
Minn. Nov. 15, 2010).
145
United States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022, 1023 (8th Cir. 2011).
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Flores v. United States, 133. S. Ct. 28 (2012).
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701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012).
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in the United States uncovered weapons.149 The defendant had been in
the United States for thirteen years, fathered three United States citizen
children with his wife, had no criminal record, and filed tax returns.150
However, he did use false social security documents to obtain a
driver’s license.151
The Fourth Circuit first examined whether the scope of the
Second Amendment right to bear arms extends to undocumented
immigrants.152 The court mentioned the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient
connections test, but also acknowledged that undocumented
immigrants may never be part of the political community and, thus,
not part of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a
right.153 Ambiguously, the court left open the possibility that
undocumented immigrants may be included in “the people” of the
Second Amendment.154
The court focused almost exclusively on the language from Heller
that the courts in Portillo-Munoz and Flores relied on: ‘“law-abiding,
responsible citizens.”’155 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
undocumented immigrants “do not belong” in a “class of law-abiding
members of the political community” to whom the Second
Amendment gives protection.”156 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the
“crime of illegal entry inherently” excludes undocumented immigrants
from “the people.”157 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss his indictment,158 and the
Supreme Court denied certiorari.159
149

Id. at 975.
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Id. at 979 (quoting Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008)).
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D. United States v. Huitron-Guizar160
The Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Huitron-Guizar in
2012, after Portillo-Munoz and Flores but before Carpio-Leon and
Meza-Rodriguez. Instead of employing a categorical approach like the
Fifth, Eighth, and Fourth circuits to hold that undocumented
immigrants are not part of “the people” to whom the Second
Amendment confers a right to bear arms, the Tenth Circuit employed a
prudential approach161 similar to Judge Flaum’s concurrence in MezaRodriguez. The Tenth Circuit did not attempt to define “the people” or
consider whether undocumented immigrants are part of that group. It
found those questions “large and complicated.”162 Instead, the Tenth
Circuit preferred to “avoid the constitutional question by assuming, for
purposes of this case, that the Second Amendment, as a ‘right of the
people,’ could very well include, in the absence of a statute restricting
such a right, at least some unlawfully here.”163 The Tenth Circuit held
that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5) passed intermediate scrutiny.164 The
Supreme Court denied certiorari.165
THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT READING OF “THE PEOPLE” COMPORTS WITH
PRECEDENT AND CONSISTENCY
Since 2011, four federal circuit courts have addressed whether the
Second Amendment confers a right to bear arms to undocumented
immigrants.166 While the Supreme Court has left the issue open by
160

678 F.3d 1164 (10th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1169.
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Id.
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Id. at 1170.
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Huitron-Guizar v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 289 (2012).
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See United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437 (5th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Flores, 663 F.3d 1022 (8th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); United States v. CarpioLeon, 701 F.3d 974 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664
(7th Cir. 2015).
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denying certiorari to the previous three decisions, the approach
adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Meza-Rodriguez is superior because
it aligns with precedent and provides a consistent reading of the
constitutional amendments that mention “the people.”
First, the reading of the Second Amendment adopted by the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourth Circuits undervalues the emphasis the Supreme
Court placed on the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient connections test in
Heller. The Heller Court did not attempt to outline an exhaustive list
of who constitutes “the people” as defined by the Second
Amendment.167 Instead, the Heller Court looked to Verdugo-Urquidez
to find that “the people” encompasses “all members of the political
community, not an unspecified subset.”168 Therefore, in Heller, a
Second Amendment case, the Court invoked the definition of “the
people” put forth in Verdugo-Urquidez, a Fourth Amendment case.169
This suggests that the Supreme Court reads “the people” consistently
“in all six other provisions of the Constitution that mention ‘the
people.’”170 By not employing the Verdugo-Urquidez sufficient
connections test in the Second Amendment context, the Fifth, Eighth,
and Fourth Circuits complicated an already vague and amorphous
phrase. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s application of the sufficient
connections test reflects a consistent reading of the Supreme Court’s
cases that discuss who constitute “the people.”171 Indeed, the Seventh
Circuit’s interpretation of the language of the Second Amendment
“treat[s] identical phrasing the same way” and respects that the “first
ten amendments were adopted as a package.”172
The Fourth, Eighth, and Fifth circuits relied on other language in
Heller that might suggest that Heller stood for the proposition that the
Second Amendment right to bear arms is limited to “all Americans”173
167

Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).
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Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664.
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Id. at 670.
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 581.
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or to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”174 “All Americans”175 is a
vague term. People in the United States can surely be considered
Americans; the United States is located in North America. However,
Americans may also refer to human beings in Central America or
South America. To take proprietary ownership of the term
“Americans” ignores the fact that the United States is just one country
out of many, including those located in Central and South America,
that may refer to its people as “Americans.”
In addition, “law-abiding, responsible citizens”176 is another
phrase that promotes ambiguity. While it may seem easy enough to
determine who is law-abiding and who is not, this is less clear in the
immigration context. As the Seventh Circuit noted, many
undocumented immigrants in the United States arrived in this country
as young children and “were too young to form the requisite intent” to
contravene the immigration laws of the United States.177 While a
person may become aware of her undocumented status as she grows
older, new programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals
provides avenues to protect those persons from removal
proceedings.178 The Fifth Circuit in Portillo-Munoz did not take that
idea into account; it stated plainly that “aliens who enter or remain in
this country illegally are not Americans.”179 Similarly, the Fourth
Circuit in Carpio-Leon concluded, without elaborating, that “illegal
aliens are not law-abiding members of the political community.”180 In
her report and recommendation to the United States District Court for
the District of Minnesota, Magistrate Judge Mayeron stated that any
person who enters the United States unlawfully is “inherently not
174

Id. at 635.
Id. at 581.
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Id. at 635.
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United States v. Meza-Rodriguez, 798 F.3d 664, 673 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/considerationdeferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Aug. 3, 2015).
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United States v. Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d 437, 440 (5th Cir. 2011).
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United States v. Carpio-Leon, 701 F.3d 974, 979 (4th Cir. 2012).
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‘law-abiding’”181 and does not retain a Second Amendment right to
bear arms.182 While those courts stress the “law-abiding, responsible
citizens” language in Heller, that language was not controlling as to
whether Second Amendment rights extend to undocumented
immigrants. That type of analysis misses a crucial point in Heller: to
determine who constitutes “the people” to whom the Second
Amendment confers a right to bear arms, the Heller Court emphasized
its sufficient connections test as laid out in Verdugo-Urquidez.183
Instead of precluding undocumented immigrants from a Second
Amendment rights by highlighting the vague language in Heller and
ignoring the Heller Court’s emphasis on the Verdugo-Urquidez
sufficient connections test, the Seventh Circuit correctly applied the
test consistently.
Moreover, the Fifth Circuit’s attempt to disregard VerdugoUrquidez through an attenuated distinction between the Fourth and
Second Amendments presents a distinction without a difference. The
Fifth Circuit in Portillo-Munoz stated that the two amendments carried
different purposes: the Second Amendment confers an affirmative
right, whereas the Fourth Amendment is protective.184 This distinction
is problematic in light of Heller. The Heller Court noted that the
“Second Amendment, like the First and Fourth Amendment, codified a
pre-existing right.”185 Heller never refers to any “affirmative right”
when discussing the Second Amendment or “protective right” when
discussing the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit’s
distinction between the Second and Fourth Amendments ignores the
Heller Court’s insistence on consistency when interpreting identical
language.186 The Heller Court clarified that a reading of the Second
Amendment that limited “the people” would not level with the other
181

United States v. Flores, No. 10-178 (JNE/JSM) 2010 WL 4721069, at*2 (D.
Minn. Sept. 17, 2010).
182
Id.
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Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580 (2008).
184
Portillo-Munoz, 643 F.3d at 440–41.
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Heller, 554 U.S. at 593 (emphasis in original).
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See id. at 580.
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six constitutional provisions that contain “the people.”187 It then
immediately invoked Verdugo-Urquidez’s sufficient connections test to
clarify the meaning of “the people.”188 Instead of analyzing the issue
consistently with Heller and Verdugo-Urquidez, the Fifth Circuit
forged a new, meaningless path based on perceived amendment
purposes, without further elaboration. It should also be noted that
neither the Fourth nor the Eighth circuits, the only other appeals courts
to hold similarly to Portillo-Munoz, have adopted a similar line of
reasoning based on an amendment’s purpose. Conversely, the Seventh
Circuit in Meza-Rodriguez appropriately followed Heller and VerdugoUrquidez.189 In so doing, the Seventh Circuit presented a line of
reasoning that is consistent with Supreme Court cases, and that can
serve as a superior model for other circuits.
CONCLUSION
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, three
federal circuit courts of appeals have held that undocumented
immigrants fall outside “the people” to whom the Second Amendment
confers a right to bear arms. In so doing, those circuits have
undervalued, and even ignored, language in previous Supreme Court
cases. The Seventh Circuit’s recent opinion in United States v. MezaRodriguez addressed the issue in a manner superior to the Fifth,
Eighth, and Fourth Circuits. The Seventh Circuit followed Supreme
Court reasoning on the Fourth Amendment to read identical language
consistently and made a logical extension of the meaning of “the
people” to Meza-Rodriguez. In so doing, the Seventh Circuit correctly
determined that undocumented immigrants in the United States make
up part of “the people” to whom the Second Amendment confers a
right to bear arms.
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